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THE SUPREME COURT'S 1984-85 CHURCH-STATE
DECISIONS: JUDICIAL PATHS OF LEAST
RESISTANCE

Ruti G. Teitel*

Introduction
The scope of first amendment protection of religious freedom was a central issue during the 1984-85 Supreme Court
Term. 1 Of the 185 cases granted review, seven alleged violations
of the religion clauses~ 2 Five of these claimed violations of the
establishment clause, challenging prayer in public schools,3 government aid to parochial schools,4 display of a Nativity scene
on public land,5 and legislation requiring employers to allow
Sabbath observers a day of rest. 6 Two cases asserted free exercise claims, challenging government regulation of commercial
activities of religious institutions7 and a state requirement of
photographs on drivers' licenses. 8 These cases were litigated at
a time when the Burger Court's approach to religion cases was
in a state of flux, departing from the Warren Court's legacy of
strict separation of church and state and from strict application
*Assistant Director, Legal Affairs Department, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith. J.D., Cornell Law School, 1980; B.S., Georgetown University, 1977. The author
would like to thank Robert Sugarman, Steven Freeman, the Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith, and Weil, Gotshal & Manges for their assistance. The views expressed
in this Article are solely those of the author.
1 The first amendment's establishment and free exercise clauses provide, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion~ or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof ...."U.S. Const. amend. I.
2 Religion cases, especially those dealing with free exercise issues, also account for
a significant number of cases on the Court's 1985-86 docket. See infra text accompanying notes 188-200.
3 Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
•Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105
S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
5 Bd. of Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985), ajf'g by an equally divided
Court McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984).
6 Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985).
7
Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985).
8 Jensen v. Quaring, 105 S. Ct. 3492 (1985), aff'g by an equally divided Court
Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984).
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of the establishment test formulated by the Burger Court itself
in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 9
In this climate of change, the Court's grant of certiorari to
seven religion cases augured a revolution in church-state doctrine.10 This revolution, however, did not occur. The outcomes
of the key establishment cases may have appeared to reaffirm
principles of separation. However, the opinions in these cases
continued the recent trend away from strict separation. The
holdings in the establishment cases were narrow and can be
explained by their close factual similarities to controlling precedents rather than by a doctrinal shift. 11 Several of the 1984-85
decisions also reflect a special standard of review that is particularly protective of children. 12 Outside of these two considerations, the Court has continued to apply a considerably weakened
version of the Lemon test. 13
This Article presents a critical analysis of the Supreme
Court's 1984-85 religion cases, tracing the developments which
have transformed the Lemon test into a device which elevates
the form and context of challenged government aid to constitutional dimensions. It argues that the deferential nature of the
Court's review, and the absence of a workable theory to secure
individual religious liberty, seriously undermine the protection
of that liberty against legislative encroachment. Part I examines
the Burger Court's approach to religious issues in previous
terms and sketches an overview of the 1984-85 cases. Part II
explains how the holdings of the 1984-85 cases were determined
by precedents involving substantially similar facts. Part III presents three themes or standards that emerge from these cases.
Part IV analyzes the weakened version of the Lemon test that
is used by the current Court. Part V discusses some broad
conceptual problems in the Court's approach. Finally, Part VI
of the Article takes a brief look at the Court's 1985-86 Term.

403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
See Greenhouse, Supreme Court May Shift From Separation To Accommodation,
The Highest Legal Authority Enters Church-State Debate, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1984,
§ 4, at 2, col. 3; Lauter, Major Shift Looming in Church·State Law, Nat'! L.J., Sept.
10, 1984, at 1.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 46-100.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 112-19, 159-64.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 123-79.
9

10
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I. Context and Parameters

A. The Shift from Separation to "Accommodation"
The Burger Court's approach to religion issues began in
1971 with Lemon v. Kurtzman, which adopted a tripartite test
for establishment questions. 14 The Lemon test would invalidate
the state practice or legislation if its purpose was religious, if
its primary effect was to advance religion, or if it entailed excessive government entanglement in religious affairs. This strict
approach to establishment cases apparently derived from a belief that government support of religion is inherently coercive,
even if extended to all religions. 15 The Court in Lemon construed
the establishment clause's protection of individual religious liberty as guaranteeing independence from government promotion
or encouragement of religion.
At the same time, the Court also recognized that the free
exercise clause requires protection from government burdens
on religious liberty. 16 In the landmark case of Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 17 the Court interpreted the free exercise clause as mandating a religious exemption from compulsory school attendance
for Amish children. The free exercise clause necessitated this
exemption because the government interests in compulsory education, while strong, could not override tenets central to the
Amish religion.
This twofold understanding of the first amendment's protection of religious liberty-an establishment mandate against
14 403 U.S. at 612-13. Lemon followed more than 30 years of case-by-case review
of state legislation affecting religious freedoms. The Court first applied the free exercise
clause to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (upholding free
exercise right to proselytize in streets), and the establishment clause in Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947) (upholding state reimbursement for bus fare paid by
parochial school students). While cases during this period sometimes articulated a strict
standard concerning government financing of religion, no functional tests were proposed.
See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. 1; McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
15 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 ("Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
... pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another.") (emphasis added). Thus the Court barred religious instruction in public
schools even where it was multidenominational. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S.
203 (1948). Where the challenged support was financial, taxpayer coercion raised an
additional establishment concern. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 13.
16 See, e.g.; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (burden on free exercise must
be justified by compelling state interest); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
17 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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government promotion of religion, and a concomitant free exercise protection of individual religious interests-appeared t<;>
erode in recent terms. A more permissive approach, which allowed government financial aid for a variety of religious purposes, developed in its stead. The Court upheld government aid
to religion in several cases: Lynch v. Donnelly 18 upheld a municipally-funded Nativity display; Marsh v. Chambers 19 upheld
a sectarian legislative chaplaincy; Widmar v. Vincent20 upheld a
public university prayer club, and Mueller v. Allen21 upheld the
allowance of tuition tax deductions to parents of parochial
school children. The Lemon test for establishment cases had
apparently given way to a more ad hoc standard of governmental
"accommodation"22 of religion, under which the Court deferred
to legislation promoting the interests of majoritarian religions.
This new version of the accommodation doctrine, drawn from
historical analysis and from free exercise doctrine, 23 confused
the relevant inquiries of the free exercise and establishment
clauses, diluting the protections afforded by both.
Applying this ad hoc standard to establishment cases, the
Court relied on longstanding "unbroken history,"24 competing
first amendment requirements,25 and other policy concerns26 to

465 U.S. 668 (1984).
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
21 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
22 See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (Constitution mandates "accommodation" of
all religions). The new accommodation doctrine claims to address a conflict between
the free exercise and establishment mandates. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673; see also
i11fra text accompanying notes 180-87.
23 The historical support derives from Story's commentaries, which are cited at
great length in Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2488-89, and from the traditional nature of the
activity, see infra text accompanying notes 102-11. The Court has drawn the free
exercise component from early Supreme Court cases such as Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding released-time program in which religious classes were held
in church buildings) and McCollum. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673.
24 See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674; Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
25 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (concern with free exercise); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 271-72 (1981) ("[A]n open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against
religious speech, would have a secular purpose and would avoid entanglement with
religion."). But see id. at 287 n.5 (White, J., dissenting) ("I know ofno precedent holding
that simply because a public forum is open to all kinds of speech-including speech
about religion-it must be open to regular religious worship services as well.").
26 See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986)
(vocational rehabilitation funding upheld even where used for religious purpose); Mueller, 463 U.S. 388 (stressing interest in education).
1s
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uphold the challenged practices. Thus accommodation, "illuminated by history," appeared to replace the Lemon test; the
Court focused on the form, context,27 and perception28 of government aid rather than on religious intent or effect.
In free exercise cases, the new accommodation doctrine
threatened to allow governmental, majoritarian interests to
override the interests of religious minorities. The interest in
maintaining traffic flow on state fair grounds, for example, defeated a religious claim of a right to circulate and proselytize
freely among visitors to the fair. 29 The Court also upheld the
government's interest in mandatory payments to Social Security
as "indispensible to the fiscal vitality of the . . . system, "30 even
though it accepted the contention that both payment and receipt
of Social Security benefits are forbidden by the Amish faith. 31
Government interests in administrative convenience and uniformity apparently outweighed the free exercise rights of groups
or individuals who challenged specific government regulation as
burdensome to religious practice.
Rather than shielding minority religions whose beliefs and
practices are at odds with government regulation, the Court
now protects majoritarian religions whose practices and beliefs
have been assimilated by affirmative governmental regulation.
Under this new approach, the only limit on governmental aid to
religion is a putative historically-based protection against
coerced orthodoxy. 32 When the Court relied on tradition to uphold the Lynch Nativity scene and the legislative chaplaincy in
Marsh, it essentially decreed that minority religions must accommodate majoritarian religious practices which have become
part of, and legitimated by, American culture. The mere passage
of time thus acts as a statute of limitations; a practice that
See infra text accompanying notes 134-57.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See infra text accompanying
notes 158-74.
29 Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
30 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982).
31 Id. at 257.
32 Thus in Lynch the test was whether the challenged legislation "in reality .•.
establishes a religious faith, or tends to do so." 465 U.S. at.678. This standard was
adopted verbatim by the Lynch Court from the Solicitor General's arguments in the
case. See Brief amicus curiae of the United States at 36. The United States has been
promoting the new accommodation doctrine. See Brief amicus curiae of the United
States, Jaffree.
TT

28
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continues long enough becomes a tradition, insulated from later
establishment challenge. 33
B. Form Over Substance-A Minimalist Approach to
Protection of Individual Religious Liberty
This recent judicial shift, in which the Court adopted accommodation in the context of government promotion of religion and upheld the government's asserted interests in efficiency
and convenience when minority religions sought accommodation, indicated a new judicial deference to majoritarian legislation. When the Court granted review to seven church-state cases
in the 1984-85 Term, this trend was expected to climax with
the consolidation of a new doctrine.
This consolidation did not take place. The Court struck
down various forms of government aid to religion as violating
the establishment clause: Wallace v. Jaffree 34 invalidated an
Alabama silent prayer statute; Thornton v. Caldor35 overturned
a Connecticut statute providing absolute accommodation for
Sabbath observers, notwithstanding the resulting burden or inconvenience on the employer or fellow workers; Grand Rapids
v. Ball36 and Aguilar v. Felton31 invalidated state and federal
programs which financed remedial and enrichment courses
taught by public and private school teachers on parochial school
premises. In Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 38 the
Court denied a free exercise claim for an exemption from federal
minimum wage laws for the commercial activities of an evangelical organization. Finally, the Court divided equally in both
Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 39 which upheld use of public
land for a privately financed Nativity display, and Jensen v.
ii See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 626 (establishment claim made in Walz "could not stand
up against more than 200 years of virtually universal practice imbedded in our colonial
experience and continuing into the present").
:w 105 S. Ct. at 2479.
is 105 S. Ct. 2914, 2917.
:J6 105 S. Ct. 3216.
i 7 105 S. Ct. 3232.
is 105 S. Ct. 1953.
i 9 105 S. Ct. 1859.
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Quaring, 40 which upheld a free exercise exemption from driver's
·
license photograph requirements.
In light of previous decisions such as Mueller, Marsh and
Lynch, which allowed various forms of government aid to religion, some commentators interpreted the results in J affree,
Grand Rapids, Aguilar and Thornton as a return to principles
of separation of church and state, as crucial to the protection
of religious liberty and as a revitalization of the Lemon test in
analyzing establishment challenges. 41
This Article takes a different view. Much of the 1984-85
Term can be seen as narrow application of precedent rather than
as a retreat from the Court's recent accommodation initiative.42
More significantly, the standards of review employed in these
opinions would allow some government aid intended for a religious purpose. While the Court has not yet clearly articulated
a new doctrine, it appears to be groping for standards of judicial
review. Several Justices have interpreted the first amendment
religion clauses to prohibit government financial assistance only
if the reasons for such assistance are exclusively religious. 43
Under this approach, any secular purpose will justify government aid to religion.
The Court now places more importance on the appearance
or perception of government aid than on its objective. This
emphasis is reflected in the application of a new, weakened form
of the Lemon test and in the "endorsement test" proposed by
Justice O'Connor in her Lynch concurrence.44 It is also reflected
in a heightened concern with the form and context of the government aid. 45 This perspective provides great protection to
children, who are considered to be more likely to perceive
government aid as government endorsement, but little protection to minority religious interests in general. It also demonstrates continued judicial permissiveness toward government
105 S. Ct. 3492.
See, e.g., McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 2
(forthcoming).
42
See infra text accompanying notes 46-100.
43 See infra text accompanying notes 124-30.
44
See infra text accompanying notes 165-74.
4s See infra text accompanying notes 135-57.
40

41
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support of religion. Such permissiveness is particularly threatening to minority religions, because majoritarian community
acceptance is inherent in any "longstanding tradition." Without
independent judicial review, majoritarian religious practices will
be virtually impossible to challenge.
Thus while there is a consensus on the Court which would
sustain government aid to majoritarian religions, depending
upon the form and context of the aid, the same consensus would
deny free exercise exemptions sought by minority religions,
deferring instead to the legislature's concern with mere administrative or economic interests. The Court's new accommodation approach has simultaneously reduced both establishment
and free exercise protections, abdicating issues of individual
religious liberty to the legislature, where they will rise or fall as
a matter of majority fiat.
II. Old Wine in New Bottles
One reason why the 1984-85 decisions should not be viewed
as a return to separation is that they presented facts very similar
to those of previous cases that were decided under a stricter
approach. Several of the 1984-85 cases involved clear attempts
to circumvent those earlier rulings. It is not surprising, therefore, that the results in these new cases upheld the separation
of church and state. The holdings were narrow, however, with
limited precedential value. Furthermore, the results, determined
by previous cases, should not disguise the continuing deterioration of separation principles.
A. The Return of School Prayer
Wallace v. Jaffree 46 posed the first reconsideration of
teacher-led religious activities in the public schools since the
decisions in Engel v. Vitale 41 and Abington School District v.

46

47

105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating teacher-led prayer in public schools).
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Schempp48 in the 1960's barred teacher-led school prayer and
Bible reading. 49 The J affree decision, striking down Alabama
legislation which authorized a one-minute period of silence "for
meditation or voluntary prayer,"50 rests on the determination
that the statute's purpose was exclusively religious. 51 This conclusion is based on the legislative history of the statute as well
as its text. Since the statute at issue amended prior legislation
providing only for "meditation," the Court found the addition
of the words "or voluntary prayer" to indicate that "the State
intended to characterize prayer as a favored practice. "52 The
Court held that this endorsement of religion violated the establishment clause.
The impact of Jaffree is limited to the reaffirmation of a
silent version of Engel; a majority of the Justices believes that
the Alabama statute shared the Engel statute's objective of
authorizing teacher-led prayer. The Court does not indicate a
willingness to go further and find that all teacher-led moments
of silence violate the establishment clause. To the contrary, the
Court appears to approve of the prior Alabama "meditation"
statute as "merely protecting every student's right to engage in
voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during
the school day."53 The concurring opinions of Justices Powell
and O'Connor also support some form of moment of silence
legislation. 54 The J affree decision thus decides only the permissibility of government-endorsed silent prayer and not, contrary
to popular view, the constitutionality of government-sponsored
moments of silence.
48

374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating recitation of Lord's Prayer and Bible reading).
When the Court considered Jaffree, 24 other moment of silence statutes were in
force nationwide, all of which had been enacted subsequent to Engel and Schempp. See
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2498 n.1.
50
Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984).
51
105 S. Ct. at 2492 ("The Legislature enacted§ 16-1-20.1 ... for the sole purpose
of expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the beginning
of each school day.").
49

52

Id.
Id. at 2491.
54
Id. at 2495 (Powell, J., concurring) ("the 'effect' ofa straightforward moment-ofsilence statute is unlikely to 'advanc[e] or inhibit religion"'); id. at 2501 (O'Connor, J.,
53

concurring) ("moment of silence laws in many States should pass establishment clause
scrutiny").
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B. "On Premises" Aid to Parochial Schools
The 1984-85 parochiaid cases arose against the background
of the 1983 Mueller5 5 decision. Mueller sustained a tuition tax
deduction benefitting parents of parochial school children but
theoretically available to parents of public school children as
well. 56 The Court in Mueller relied on the ostensible availability
of tax relief to all parents in order to distinguish adverse precedent, 57 even though parents of public school children rarely
incurred the expenses necessary to qualify for the deduction. 58
This fiction of equal aid sufficed to change the result even though
the statute retained the effect of uniquely benefitting parents of
parochial school children.
In this context of apparent judicial receptivity to government support for parochial schools, Grand Rapids v. Ball59 and
Aguilar v. Felton60 brought the schoolroom back to the Court
in the 1984-85 Term. Both cases involved legislative schemes
which skirted Meek v. Pittenger, 61 where the Court had prohibited state employees, including teachers, from providing services to parochial school students on the school premises.
In Grand Rapids, the Court considered two state-financed
programs, Shared Time and Community Education, which provided courses for parochial school students- in classrooms located in, and leased from, parochial schools. The Shared Time
instructors were primarily public school teachers. The Community Education instructors were full-time parochial school
teachers, functioning as part-time "public school" teachers at

463 U.S. 388 (1983).
The statute at issue in Mueller provides a deduction for actual expenses incurred
for the "tuition, textbooks and transportation" of dependents attending elementary or
secondary schools. It does not distinguish between public and parochial school expenses. See 463 U.S. at 391.
57 Mueller had ·come close to overruling a prior case, Comm. for Public Educ. and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), in which the Court invalidated a
New York statute providing a tax credit only to parents of private school students. The
Mueller fiction of equal aid to both religious and nonreligious parents of school children
apparently swayed Justice Powell from his opposition to the tuition tax credit in Nyquist.
Powell's vote was also crucial in Grand Rapids and Aguilar.
58 See infra note 148.
59 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
ro 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
61 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
55

56
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the close of the parochial school day, when they taught the
program's secular courses. The statute attempted to evade Meek
by providing for the "leasing" of parochial school premises,
theoretically converting them into a "public school" while the
programs took place. 62
Aguilar v. Felton involved a Title I program of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,63 which provided
federal funds to pay the salaries of public school employees
teaching remedial courses on parochial school premises. The
drafters of the Title I program64 sought to circumvent Meek by
providing for supervision of the public school teachers to prevent any religious indoctrination. 65
The Court relied on Meek as controlling precedent when it
invalidated the programs in Grand Rapids and Aguilar. 66 The
narrowness of the holdings, however, reflects a lack of consensus for extending this precedent. Government aid for religious
schools is not deemed to be unconstitutional in itself; providing
assistance to all school children, including those attending religious schools, satisfies the Court's requirement of a secular
purpose. 67 As in Meek, the operative fact is not the government
aid in itself, but rather the delivery of that aid on religious school
premises. 68 The Court explained the importance of the latter by
emphasizing the danger that school children will perceive government programs on parochial grounds as an official endorsement of religion. 69 From this perspective, the ongoing govern105 S. Ct. at 3220.
See 20 U.S.C. § 3805(a) (1982).
64 Title I authorizes federal funding for programs proposed by local educational
agencies and approved by state educational agencies. 20 U.S.C. § 3805(a) (1982).
65 This supervision responded to the Court's suggestions in Meek: "To be certain
that auxiliary teachers remain religiously neutral, as the Constitution demands, the State
would have to impose limitations on the activities of auxiliary personnel and then engage
in some form of continuing surveillance to ensure that those restrictions were being
followed." 421 U.S. at 372. The Aguilar Court, however, found this supervision to
present entanglement problems. 105 S. Ct. at 3237.
66 See Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3225; Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3238.
67 See, e.g., Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3223 (Although the Court found that here
the "principal effect of the challenged programs [was] to advance ... religion," the
Court upheld the lower court's finding that "the purpose of the Community Education
and Shared Time programs was 'manifestly secular.'").
68
See Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3236 ("aid is provided in a pervasively sectarian
environment"); Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3223 ("inquiry must begin with a consideration of the nature of the institutions in which the programs operate").
69 See Grand Rllpids, 105 S. Ct. at 3223. This focus on the "imprimatur"-here, the
62
63
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ment inspections in Aguilar were not an acceptable remedy for
the risks presented.
C. Public Display of a Privately Financed Nativity Scene
Board of Trustees v. McCreary70 forced the Court to confront the implications of its earlier decisions in Widmar v.
Vincent71 and Lynch v. Donnelly. 72 Appellees in McCreary
claimed a free speech right to erect their Nativity display for a
two-week period on a small public traffic circle park in the center
of town. The Village of Scarsdale objected on establishment
clause grounds. Relying on Widmar and Lynch, the Second
Circuit upheld appellees' right to erect a Nativity display on
public property. 73
McCreary raised several issues which earlier decisions had
left unresolved: To what extent does the religious free speech
right recognized in Widmar extend to an unattended display?
Where public forum principles do not compel access to village
land, is access a discretionary matter for the village government? After Lynch, are there any limits to a village's discretion
over Nativity displays, or would public sponsorship be impermissible where the display is solitary, rather than surrounded
by secular symbols, and where it is located on public, rather
than private, land? Towns and villages across the nation were
asking these types of questions;74 unfortunately, the Court failed
to answer them during the 1984-85 Term. Justice Powell's absence from the McCreary oral argument left an equally divided
Court affirming the Second Circuit's holding. Justice Powell had
provided the crucial vote in two other establishment cases of
the Term, Grand Rapids and Aguilar, and his concern during
children's perception of the government aid-appears to limit Grand Rapids and Aguilar,
as well as Meek, to the special "religion in the schools" caselaw. See infra text accompanying notes 112-19, 158-64.
10 105 S. Ct. at 3216.
71 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (student prayer group had free speech right to meet on public
university grounds).
n 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (allowing government financial sponsorship of Nativity
display).
73 McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d at 726-27 (2d Cir. 1984).
74 See After Pawtucket: Religious Symbols on Public Land, Report of American
Jewish Congress (July, 1985) (on file with the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law
Review).
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the Term with links between public and religious institutions75
might have suggested opposition to the Scarsdale creche display.
However, this concern had not prevented Justice Powell from
joining the majority opinion in Lynch or from authoring the
opinion for the Court in Widmar. Consequently, theories of how
the case would have been decided had Justice Powell taken part
in the decision can only be speculative.
D. Establishment and Other Limits to Free Exercise

In the remaining 1984-85 religion cases, the Court continued to minimize free exercise concerns, elevating in their place
administrative or convenience interests and a purported fear of
establishment problems. Thornton v. Caldor16 concerned a statutory mandate that an employee who observed a particular day
of the week as his Sabbath could not be required by his employer
to work on that day. 77 The statute was designed to give protection for Sabbath observance after a state court eliminated Connecticut's Blue Laws. 78 However, unlike federal law, which
provides merely for "reasonable accommodation, "79 the Connecticut statute failed to qualify the Sabbath observer's right. 80
The Court invalidated the provision as impermissibly coercive, focusing on the absence of any reasonableness or balancing
test in the statute that would permit employers to consider other
interests. These ostensibly weighty concerns include the "convenience" of other employees. 81 The Court also made cursory
reference to the fact that the statute granted religious employees
a guaranteed day off every week-a right also valued by nonreligious employees. The Court held that the Connecticut statute
1s See Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3240.

105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985).
"No person who states that a particular day of the week is observed as his
Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. An employee's refusal
to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his dismissal." Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 53-303e(b) (West Supp. 1985).
78 The Connecticut Blue Laws have a complex history, both in the legislature and
in the state courts. See Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2915 n.2.
79 42 u.s.c. § 2oooeG) (1981).
80 See Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2917-18 ("the statute allows for no consideration as
to whether the employee has made reasonable accommodation proposals"); see also id.
at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
s1 See 105 S. Ct. at 2918.
76

77
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violated the establishment clause because it protected the rights
of Sabbath observers at the expense of others. 82
The nearly unanimous but cursory opinion in Thornton can
only be explained against the backdrop of prior Blue Laws
cases. In McGowan v. Maryland, 83 the Court had relied on
secular justifications to uphold Sunday closing laws against establishment challenges. 84 In Braunfeld v. Brown, 85 decided the
same year, the Court had denied Orthodox Jews a free exercise
exemption to the Sunday laws, explaining that the laws imposed
a mere economic burden, rather than a direct burden on the
exercise of religion. 86 While the state prohibited sales of retail
goods on Sundays, it did not bar a Saturday holiday; such a
direct penalty presumably would have posed a free exercise
conflict that the Court would have had to recognize. 87
As in these earlier cases, the Court in Thornton failed to
recognize the need for true free exercise accommodation. At
least two Justices considered such accommodation unnecessary,
partially because any burden suffered by Thornton was imposed
by his employer rather than by the government. 88 Even where
there is a true government-imposed conflict, however, Thornton
has wider implications for the future of free exercise accommodations. Echoing Braunfeld, the Court expressed a concern
82

Id.; see also id. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
e. "[S]ecular justifications have been advanced for making Sunday a day of rest ...
when people may recover from the labors of the week ...." 366 U.S. at 434.
BS 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
l!6 Id. at 606 ("To strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which
imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does
not make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically restrict the operating
latitude of the legislature.").
Notwithstanding the burden/penalty distinction drawn in Braunfeld, the Court has
chosen in other free exercise cases to grant exemptions where there was merely an
economic burden. See Thomas v. Review Bd. oflnd. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
87 See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606 ("[T]his is not the case before us because the
statute at bar does not make unlawful any religious practices of appellants.").
88 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion addresses this point directly, noting that
the statute "attempts to lift a burden on religious practice that is imposed by private
employers, and hence it is not the sort of accommodation statute specifically contemplated by the Free Exercise Clause." 105 S. Ct. at 2919. See also Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at
2496 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The Thornton majority does not expressly recognize the absence of a government
burden on private employees, although it does emphasize that through the statute the
state places a burden on private employers. See 105 S. Ct. at 2918.
Bl
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for equal treatment, noting that the statute would provide a
benefit only to Sabbath observers. The Court followed the analysis employed earlier in TWA v. Hardison, 89 where an employee
sought Saturdays off under the "reasonable accommodation"
standard imposed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 90 In that
case, the Court held that the desired accommodation would have
resulted in "unequal treatment" in favor of the religious observer, underscoring the constraints of equal protection within
which religious accommodation must function. 91 The Thornton
Court suggests that this accommodation, with its implicit endorsement of religion, is coercive of nonbelievers; government
"must take pains not to compel people to act in the name of any
religion." 92 In both cases, the Court's concern with unequal
treatment overshadows the fundamental free exercise mandate.
This concern for "preferential treatment," whether framed
as an equal protection or an establishment constraint, demonstrates a troublesome insensitivity to free exercise interests. The
need for free exercise accommodation arises when a neutral
government policy or practice burdens a particular religious
tenet. Government relief of that conflict should not raise a preference claim where the relief is the least restrictive alternative
necessary to lift the burden. 93 While the Connecticut statute
may not have presented such an alternative, the distinction
between burden and benefit fails to appear in the Thornton
opinion. Instead, the Court focuses on the statute's failure to
weigh convenience and other commercial interests against the
Sabbath observer's free exercise claims-a failure which should
not raise a genuine establishment problem or impinge on any
other countervailing compelling interest. The Thornton Court
does make an important but cursory reference to the putative
benefit denied to other nonreligious employees. 94 Aside from
89

432 U.S. 63 (1977).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000eG), 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982).
91 432 U.S. at 84.
92 105 S. Ct. at 2917; see also, 105 S. Ct. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The
message conveyed is one of endorsement of a particular religious belief, to the detriment
of those who do not share it.").
93 See Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2504 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
94 See Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2918 n.9.
An additional administrative question, which plagues all free exercise claims that
raise economic issues, is implicated by the facts in Thornton. In cases where the relief
90
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this, however, the Court's elevation of mere administrative or
"convenience" interests over those of free exercise indicates a
significant departure from the traditional standard requiring a
compelling government interest to defeat free exercise claims. 95
Thornton and its predecessors thus suggest that less rigorous
scrutiny now applies to conflicts between marketplace and religious interests.96
Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor97 also demonstrates this approach. A nonprofit religious organization, staffed
by its members and deriving its income largely from operating
commercial businesses, sought an exemption from minimum
wage and other provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The Court rejected the free exercise claim, finding no conflict
between the Fair Labor Standards Act's requirement of minimum benefits and the Alamo Foundation associates' religious
principles, which prohibit receiving wages. 98
In Jensen v. Quaring, 99 an equally divided Court affirmed
an Eighth Circuit decision striking down a Nebraska driver's
license statute which failed to provide a religious exemption
from the law's photograph requirement. Even though Jensen
concerned a direct government burden on religious practice,
sought would be valued outside of the religious community, such as a day off in Thornton
or an exemption from Social Security taxes, see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252
(1982), the Court often denies the exemption because of the administrative inquiry that
it asserts would be necessary to sort out sincere claims from fraudulent ones. See, e.g.,
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 609:
[T)here could well be the temptation for some, in order to keep their businesses
open on Sunday, to assert that they have religious convictions which compel
them to close their businesses on what had formerly been their least profitable
day. This might make necessary a state-conducted inquiry into the sincerity of
the individual's religious beliefs ....

But see id. at 615 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding no problem with such an inquiry).
?s See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) (state may not deny unemployment compensation to Seventh-Day Adventist
because of her refusal to accept employment requiring work on Saturdays); Prince v.
Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (compelling government interest in protecting children
overrides asserted free exercise claims concerning the use of child labor).
96 See Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2918 ("Moreover, there is no exception when honoring
the dictates of Sabbath observers would impose upon the employer substantial economic
burdens or when the employer's compliance would require the imposition of significant
burdens on other employees ....").
91 105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985).
93 Id. at 1963.
99 105 S. Ct. 3492.
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and even though the requested exemption would likely not be
a benefit desired by nonbelievers, as was arguably the case in
Thornton and _4../amo, four Justices opposed the exemption.
Thus, the Court's increasing deference to the legislature in free
exercise cases may no longer be limited to concerns about disparate economic benefits. If the administrative interest in avoiding review of exemption applications satisfies four Supreme
Court Justices, little appears to be left of the longstanding "compelling interest" requirement protective of free exereise right~. 100
III. The Search for Standards-Themes of the
1984-85 Tenn 101
A. The Tradition Standard

One theme underlying the 1984-85 religion cases is a continuing deference to "longstanding tradition," such as was used
in Marsh and Lynch to uphold a legislative chaplaincy and a
government-sponsored Nativity display. This reliance on a "tradition" exception to stricter establishment review had been used
earlier to sustain the state Blue Laws in McGowan v.
Maryland 102 and the tax exemptions for churches in Walz v. Tax
Commission. 103 The tradition standard may have also supported
more stringent free exercise review in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 104
However, the Court's application of the tradition exception to
the establishment concerns in Marsh and Lynch extended the
scope of the exception. In Marsh, history was so controlling
that the Court failed to engage in even the pro fonna establishment review employed in Walz and McGowan. In Lynch, which
extended the tradition of government accommodation of Christmas to include government sponsorship of the Nativity display,
100 See Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1128 (8th Cir. 1984) (Fagg, J.,
dissenting).
101 Because McCreary and Jensen both affirmed without opinion lower court rulings,
and because of the marginal church-state nature of Alamo Foundation v. Dept. ofLabor,
the remainder of this discussion will deal almost exclusively with the decisions in Jaffree,
Grand Rapids, Aguilar and Thornton.
102 366 U.S. 420, 431-44 (1961).
103 397 U.S. 664, 676-80 (1970).
104 406 U.S. 205, 225-27 (1972) (comparing 200 years of Amish tradition with relatively recent compulsory education).
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the Court broadened the putative government "tradition" far
beyond its historical roots. 105
The Court apparently derives its tradition standard from a
theory that examines the Founders' view of a challenged practice as the principal component of constitutional analysis. 106 This
approach itself rests on a shaky foundation. 107 More importantly,
it affords no establishment clause protection in those cases
where it may be most necessary-where the practice at issue
has promoted majoritarian interests for years without challenge.
Although the key 1984-85 religion cases upheld the establishment challenges, the opinions did not retreat from this tradition standard. The 200 years of tradition that supported the
legislative chaplains in Marsh simply did not exist for the public
school prayer in Jaffree. 108 As Justice O'Connor notes, public
schools were not even in existence at the time of the Founders,
so reconstruction of their opinions on the permissibility of
school prayer should be immaterial. 109
The Jaffree dissenting opinions also rely on an historical
basis for school prayer. Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist ground their arguments in support of school prayer
on the history of publicly sponsored congressional prayer and
on presidential Thanksgiving Day proclamations, 110 failing to
distinguish between the long history of legislative prayer and
the shorter history of public school prayer.
105

See Teitel, Book Review, 2 Const. Commentary 529 (1985).
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 1359-60.
See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
885, 939-41 (1985); see also Stevens, J., Address to the Federal Bar Ass'n (Oct. 23,
1985) (on file with the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review); Brennan, J.,
Address to Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985) (on file with the Harvard CivilRightsCivil Liberties Law Review).
103 See 105 S. Ct. at 2494 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 2502 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). This distinction was also noted by the majority opinion in Grand Rapids,
105 S. Ct. at 3226 n.9. The Court in Jaffree did not address the point directly. It did,
however, review history to examine and reject the claim that the establishment clause
serves only to protect against orthodoxy or preference among Christian sects. See 105
S. Ct. at 2488.
10? 105 S. Ct. at 2503 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11o See id. at 2505 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2508-16, 2520 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
The historical argument extends to its broadest parameters in Justice Rehnquist's
opinion. His dissent in Jaffree is based on the legislative history of the religion clauses.
Rehnquist contends that the history of the establishment clause reveals a prohibition
only against designation of a national church and assertion of official preference of one
church over another.
106
107
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The Grand Rapids, Aguilar and Thornton opinions do not
explicitly rely on historical arguments. 111 However, the lack of
a tradition for the specific statute at stake in Thornton may
explain why the Court invalidated that statute as a preferential
establishment of religion when it is unwilling to overturn the
traditional Blue Laws that favor only Christian Sabbath
observers.
B. The Protection of Children Standard
For years, schools have been battlegrounds for competing
church and state interests in controlling the education of children.112 Jaffree, Grand Rapids and Aguilar reflect the Court's
continued application of heightened scrutiny in establishment
challenges when the recipients of the aid are public and private
school children. While J affree, Grand Rapids and Aguilar each
invalidated government sponsorship under different prongs of
the tripartite Lemon standard, 113 a theme in all three opinions is
the special protection accorded to school children. This emphasis derives from the Court's concern with children's perception
of government aid. On the assumption that children are less able
to distinguish between government sponsorship and neutrality, 114 the Court has prohibited certain practices in public schools
that have survived constitutional scrutiny when performed in
other public institutions. 115
111 Justice Rehnquist, in his Grand Rapids dissent, does rely cursorily on the "first
150 years of the Establishment Clause" as putative historical support for government
assistance to religious schools. 105 S. Ct. at 3232.
112 See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
113 The Court relied on the religious purpose of the Alabama silent prayer statute,
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2492-93; the effect of the State parochial program in Grand Rapids,
105 S. Ct. at 3222-23; and the excessive entanglement of the statutory supervision
provisions in Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3237.
114 See infra text accompanying notes 159-64.
us The Court has, for instance, permitted government practices such as organized
prayer and funding for religious displays and institutions involving adults, while barring
similar government activity involving children. Compare Lynch, 465 U.S. 668 (sustaining
government-sponsored Christmas display); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (sustaining legislative
prayer by distinguishing between adults not susceptible to "religious indoctrination" and
children subject to "peer presssure"); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n.14 (university students
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This theme is particularly apparent in the Grand Rapids
opinion, which centers on the parochial school child's perception of public school instructors teaching on parochial school
premises. 116 The Court concluded that this form of government
aid advances religion in three ways. First, teachers offering
instruction on the premises of the pervasively religious schools
might inculcate religion. 117 Second, there is a symbolic link between government and religion when students see public school
employees teaching in parochial schools. 118 Finally, the Court
found that such programs might, in effect, subsidize religion
since the schools were the beneficiaries of the aid. 119
C. "Imprimatur" or Perception of Aid Standards
In deciding the 1984-85 establishment cases, the Court continued to apply an analysis based on perception of government
aid. This concern with perception influences the tradition standard and the protection of children standard described above.
Thus, the Court sustained government aid in Lynch and Marsh
because years of community approval indicated a perception
that the challenged practices were part of a larger cultural tradition. Conversely, it prohibited government aid in Jaffree,
Grand Rapids and Aguilar largely because it doubted the ability
of children to distinguish neutral support from religious endorsement. This theme has also influenced the weakening of the
Lemon test. 120
"are less impressionable than younger students," and should be able to appreciate that
the university's policy is one of neutrality toward religion); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971) (distinguishing university students as less impressionable and
less susceptible to religious indoctrination) with Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 775-77 (barring
financing for repair and maintenance of parochial school); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
80 (1980) (striking down law requiring display of Ten Commandments on public school
walls); Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (barring teacher-led school prayer).
11 6 105 S. Ct. at 3223-24.
117 Id. at 3224-26. Interestingly, the Court discounted the absence of evidence of
such inculcation in the record, reasoning that young children, who were the beneficiaries
of the instruction, were likely to be incapable of detecting this impermissible effect.
This point emphasizes the significance of the Court's choice of "perceiver" in its
analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 158-74.
118 Id. at 3227 ("In this environment, the students would be unlikely to discern the
crucial difference between the religious school and 'public-school' classes, even if the
latter were successfully kept free of religious indoctrination.").
119 Id. at 3223-24.
120 See infra text accompanying notes 131-74.
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The Court's concern with the "imprimatur" or appearance
of government approval of aid to religion is part of an analytical
framework with dangerous implications. Incorporating community perception into the religion clause standard of review
threatens the independent role of judicial review. This "imprimatur" test, combined with formalistic tests concerning the direction and context of the aid, 121 allows government aid to religion to escape constitutional scrutiny so long as the community
as a whole accepts the practice. This judicial acceptance of the
fact of government aid conflicts with the Court's assertions that
religious liberty extends to protect nonbelievers from coercion. 122 Most troubling is the supposed objectivity of the endorsement test. The determinative question is whose perceptions will govern. Focusing on perceptions, especially
"objective" perceptions, ultimately endangers the religious minorities whose rights were intended to be the central focus of
the religion clauses.
IV. The Weakened Lemon Test
The 1984-85 Term witnessed an unsurprising reappearance
of the Lemon establishment test. While eschewed in the previous Term's "tradition" cases, the test had been consistently
applied in cases involving religion in the schools. 123 Cases involving school children formed a substantial part of the 198485 religion docket, and the remaining cases failed to present a
"tradition" alternative. The current version of the test, however,
is a weak shadow of the original. At best, it will ferret out
government aid intended exclusively for a religious purpose, as
the Court found expressly in J affree and implicitly in Thornton.
Where the government aid has a mixed purpose, the new Lemon
test has virtually no impact, since only some secular purpose is
required. The Court will probably sustain the aid if it considers
it sufficiently "indirect" or if it is sandwiched in an array of
other nonreligious aid-unless the perceivers of that aid are
children, who have an arguably diminished capacity to distin121
122
123

See infra text accompanying notes 135-57.
See, e.g., Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3222-23.
See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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guish between government aid for secular purposes and aid for
religious purposes.
A. Evolution of the Purpose Prong

The first prong of the Lemon test asks whether government
aid has a religious purpose. In the 1973 case of Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist, the Court applied this test strictly,
evaluating a parochiaid statute by looking for a "clearly secular"
legislative purpose. 124 Lynch weakened this "secular purpose"
inquiry when it held that any secular purpose could save government legislation that is primarily intended to advance religion.125 As applied in Jaffree, the majority and concurring opinions stress that it is the absence of any secular purpose for
Alabama's silent prayer statute which invalidates the
legislation. 126
Thus, under the new interpretation of the Lemon test, legislation need only have one secular purpose to withstand establishment review. Under this minimal purpose inquiry, almost all
government aid to religion would be permissible, even if such
aid goes beyond the type of historically sanctioned aid to religion
upheld in Lynch and Marsh. Moreover, O'Connor's Jaffree concurrence argues that the Court's inquiry must be "deferential"
and "limited" to the legislature's "stated intent." 127
This minimal purpose inquiry appears to be mere pro forma
judicial review. 128 The Court should not uphold a statute on the
basis of a legislative declaration of a single secular purpose.
Rather, it should probe deeply into the legislative motivation.
A mere "avowed" secular purpose ought not be sufficient to
save a statute passed with the intent to aid religion. 129 The

413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973).
465 U.S. at 681.
126 105 S. Ct. at 2492; id. at 2500 (O'Connor J., concurring); id. at 2495 (Powell, J.,
concurring). O'Connor's "endorsement" test also examines the purpose of legislation,
to determine whether it is intended to convey a message of endorsement. See id. at
2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
127 Id. at 2500.
128 See id. at 2517 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The purpose prong means little if it
only requires the legislature to express any secular purpose and omit all sectarian
references ..•• ").
129 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
12•
12s
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Court's refusal to scrutinize legislative purpose is especially
ominous in the evolution of the school prayer statutes. So long
as any singular secular purpose is apparent, a moment of silence
statute would likely pass the Court's minimal purpose inquiry. 130
B. The "Imprimatur" Effect Test
The effect prong of the Lemon test has traditionally distinguished aid having a "primary effect" of advancing religion from
aid having an "indirect" or "incidental" effect. 131 In Grand Rapids and Thornton, the Court did strike down government aid
which had the primary effect of advancing religion. 132 These
cases weakened the Lemon effect test, however, by their emphasis on imprimatur or perception of endorsement. 133 The
Court focused on whether, given the objective context of the
government aid and the subjective perception by the recipients,
the aid was likely to be interpreted as a government message of
endorsement of religion. 134 In applying the objective portion of
this test, the Court upheld the aid where it was not provided
directly to the religious institution or where it was submerged
in an array of other, nonreligious beneficiaries.
1. Objective Imprimatur: Form and Context
a. Directness of Aid
The parochiaid schemes in Grand Rapids and Aguilar provided public financing of teaching in private religious schools.
130

This question has plagued the courts in other moment of silence cases. See,

e.g., May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985) (striking down moment of silence
statute); see also Walter v. West Virginia Bd. of Educ., 610 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. W. Va.
1985) (striking down moment of silence statute which explicitly referred to prayer).
m See Roemer v. Md. Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 758 (1976); Nyquist, 413 U.S.
at 771; Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742-43 (1973).
132
See Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3226-27; Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2918.
133
Compare Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. l, 16 (1947) (establishment clause
was intended to erect a wall of separation between church and state) with Jaffree, 105
S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (establishment clause precludes statutes whose
purpose and effect go against the grain of protected religious liberties).
134
See Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3226; Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2490; Lynch, 465
U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274.
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Rejecting arguments that this aid benefitted only the children, 135
the Court held the "on premises" programs to be unconstitutional "direct" aid to religious institutions. 136 The directness of
the aid distinguished these programs from the tax deductions in
Mueller which went to parents of parochial school children. The
private decisionmaking stressed in Mueller was central again in
Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 131
the first church-state decision of the 1985-86 Term. In Witters,
the Court upheld vocational assistance for a blind man to train
for the ministry at a religious college because the final decision
to attend the religious institution rested with the individual. 138
This emphasis on the directness of the aid entails a formalistic inquiry which reflects the Court's concern with appearances. Whether a check is made out to a religious school or to
a parent of a child attending that religious school, the source of
the aid is the govemment139 and the ultimate beneficiaries are
religious institutions which will be using the aid for religious
purposes. The existence of a "middleman" should be irrelevant
to the constitutional inquiry.

b. Presence of an Array of Beneficiaries
The presence or absence of an array of beneficiaries-religious and nonreligious alike-has emerged as another crucial
factor in the new Lemon effect analysis. The Court appears to
be convinced that aid to religion constitutes "neutrality" when
it is extended to nonreligious beneficiaries as well, notwithstanding that the establishment clause necessitates different constitutional standards for aid to religious as opposed to nonreligious
recipients. Prior parochiaid cases, for example, had sustained

13 ' Brief amicus curiae of the United States at 15, Grand Rapids; Brief amicus
curiae of the United States at 16, Aguilar.
136 See Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3228; Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3241 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
131 106 S. Ct. at 752.
138 Id. at 752.
139 Indeed, this was acknowledged in Grand Rapids. See 105 S. Ct. at 3228 (noting
that in Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) and Nyquist the Court struck down programs
where the aid was formally given to parents because "these differences in form were
insufficient to save programs whose effect was indistinguishable from that of a direct
subsidy to religious schools").
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government provision of buses and textbooks when the aid was
offered to both religious and nonreligious school children. 140 In
recent terms, this factor developed into a central inquiry. In
Widmar, the Court held that the presence of an array of beneficiaries, including many secular clubs, diminished the likelihood
that the challenged student religion club would have the effect
of advancing religion. 141 In Lynch, the Court relied on a variation
of this array analysis, upholding the Nativity display which was
literally within an array of secular Christmas symbols. 142 In
Mueller, the Court upheld tax deductions to defray educational
expenses because the benefits were theoretically available to an
array of religious and secular beneficiaries-parents of both
parochial and public school children. 143
Conversely, the absence in Grand Rapids, Aguilar and
Thornton of an array of beneficiaries appears to be central to
the Court's invalidation of the government aid. Grand Rapids
and Aguilar involved assistance that primarily benefitted parochial school children. 144 Likewise, the Court in Thornton emphasized that the Sabbath observer was the sole beneficiary of
the Connecticut statute.1 45
The presence of an array of beneficiaries, religious and
nonreligious, undeniably lessens the perception of government
aid. Yet the centrality of the array factor in the Court's effect
analysis threatens the vitality of establishment review. A statutory scheme may boast a secular array which is false or entirely hypothetical, designed to mask the fact that the aid is
going exclusively to religion. For example, while the program
in Aguilar would aid low income children of all schools, public
and private, the great majority of private schools benefitting
140 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947). See also Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398 n.8, citing Tilton and Walz as
examples of aid accorded to all educational and charitable non-profit institutions.
141 454 U.S. at 274. Cf Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3226. See Teitel, The Unconstitutionality of Equal Access Policies and Legislation Allowing Organized StudentInitiated Religious Activities in the Public High Schools: A Proposal for a Unitary First
Amendment Forum Analysis, 12 Hastings Const. L.Q. 529 (1985).
142 See 465 U.S. at 671.
143 463 U.S. at 398.
144 See Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3235; Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3223. But see Brief
amicus curiae of the United States at 14, Grand Rapids; Brief amicus curiae of the
United States at 16, Aguilar.
14s 105 S. Ct. at 2917-18.
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from the federal funding were parochial. 146 McCreary posed a
similar false array problem. While the public traffic circle park
was theoretically available for religious and nonreligious expression, over the years most of the beneficiaries were proponents of religious displays.1 41
This false array problem demonstrates the necessity that
any array be preexisting, like the one in Widmar, in order to
diminish the imprimatur of government aid. Finding itself in a
dilemma of its own making, the Court appears to be struggling
with this issue. In Mueller, the Court found the patently hypothetical array sufficient to diminish imprimatur148 whereas in
Grand Rapids and Aguilar, it did not. 149 Jaffree also highlights
these difficulties; although Justice O'Connor's concurrence suggests that moment of silence legislation which provides for silent
prayer as one of an array of alternatives would be constitutional, iso such an array is exactly what was provided by the
Alabama statute as amended to allow for "meditation or prayer."
In striking down the statute, the Court in essence held that
Alabama had provided a false array.
A more fundamental problem with the array approach is
the extent to which religious and nonreligious beneficiaries may
be treated equally. The Court's current approach obfuscates
what, if anything, the first amendment religion clauses say about
this matter. Clearly, some forms of government aid may be
provided on an equal basis; most would agree that police and
fire protection ought to be offered to churches on the same basis
as to secular institutions. It does not follow, however, that tax
monies may be divided equally among public and parochial
schools. 1s1 A distinction should be drawn between provision of
secular government services and provision of other government
services which may advance religious goals. Services such as
105 S. Ct. at 3235-36.
See McCreary v. Stone, 575 F. Supp. 1112, 1115-16, 1123-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
148 463 U.S. at 397. Cf. id. at 400 n.9 (Minn. Dept. of Revenue reported that only
taxpayers with dependents in nonpublic schools benefitted); id. at 405 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
149 The difference may have been determined by other effect factors, such as the
directness of the aid-deductions to parents were upheld in Mueller; on-premises aid
was struck down in Grand Rapids and Aguilar.
uo 105 S. Ct. at 2501.
1s 1 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 260 (Brennan, J., concuning).
146
147
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police and fire protection retain their secular nature even when
provided to a religious beneficiary. 152 Once government funds
are provided to a religious institution, though, they may be
diverted to advance religion, 153 violating basic establishment
principles. Furthermore, such funding conflicts with the Court's
asserted concern for protecting the liberty of disbelievers; when
tax funds are doled out to religious institutions, there is automatic coercion of nonadherents. 154 Because the Court did not
even mention this taxpayer coercion in Grand Rapids and Aguilar, such coercion apparently no longer concerns it.
Thus the Court's emphasis on arrays undercuts the establishment clause mandate that religion be treated differently from
secular concerns. The array standard similarly jeopardizes free
exercise accommodation principles which would assist only religious beneficiaries. 155 This is apparent in Thornton, where the
Court sought to equate religious and secular interests. 156 The
array standard brings to the fore the conflict between principles
of equality and the religion clauses' mandate of different, special
treatment for religion. 157
2. Subjective Imprimatur-The Observer of
Government Aid

The subjective aspect of the Court's new endorsement approach centers on the perception of the government aid. This
concern with perceptions reflects a view of government assistance to religion as a two-way street. A message of government
endorsement is the result of a dialogue between government and
observers of government assistance. 158 This raises the question
of whose perception is determinative. Where children are in152 At least one Justice has employed this distinction. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 643
(Brennan, J., concurring) (distinguishing impermissible public funding in Lemon from
reimbursement for bus fare in Everson and loan of textbooks in Allen).
153 See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 106 S. Ct. 752 (1986).
154 See Engel, 370 U.S. at 444 (Douglas, J., concurring); Everson, 330 U.S. at

15-16.
"
iss See Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2504 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
156
See 105 S. Ct. at 2918.
157 See Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2504 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
158 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (''The meaning of a

statement to its audience depends both on the intention of the speaker and on the
'objective' meaning of the statement in the community.").
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volved, their perceptions trigger a heightened scrutiny. In other
cases, the issue revolves around the perceptions of the nonadherent versus the perceptions of the public at large.
a. Lemon and the Children

Historically, many forms of government assistance to religion, sustained as to adults, have been barred on school premises where children are the perceivers of the government involvement with religion. 159 In Marsh, for example, the Court
emphasized that "the individual claiming injury by the practice
is an adult, presumably not readily susceptible to 'religious
indoctrination' ... or peer pressure." 160 Children, on the other
hand, may be unable to distinguish between government sponsorship and neutrality. Due to their inexperience and impressionability, it is difficult for them to differentiate government aid
for a secular purpose from aid for a religious purpose. 161
Jaffree, Grand Rapids and Aguilar reflect this concern for
children's perceptions of a symbolic link between government
and religion. In Grand Rapids and Aguilar, the Court held that,
while the respective state and federal legislatures did not intend
to endorse religion, the teachers involved in the aid programs
would nonetheless convey this message to children. This would
be true regardless of the nature of the teacher's involvement,
given the children's youth and impressionability. 162
Jaffree also evidences concern for the school child's perceptions. While the Court focuses on the exclusively religious
purpose intended by the legislature, rendering inquiry into the
statute's effect unnecessary, the opinion reiterates the special
difficulties the school child encounters in distinguishing between
neutrality and sponsorship. 163 Accordingly, the impressionability
of school children continues to elevate the level of judicial protection against government coercion of individual religious
freedom. 164
1'9

See supra note 115.
463 U.S. at 792.
See Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3224-27; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
162 See Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3227; Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3237-38.
163 105 S. Ct. at 242 n.51.
164 Compulsory school attendance also heightens the concern with coercion. See
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2503 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
160
161
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b. The O'Connor Endorsement Test: "Nonadherent" vs.
the "Populace at Large"

The Court has gone beyond this concern for children, using
the perception standard in other contexts as well. Although
Justice O'Connor first proposed the "endorsement" inquiry in
her Lynch concurrence, 165 a majority of the Court now appears
to recognize it. 166 The key question in this conceptual framework
is the source of the relevant perception, and the 1984-85 cases
reflect the Court's struggle to respond.
The choice is between the minority "nonadherent" and the
"reasonable person" or the "public at large"; the decision among
them affects the nature of judicial review. O'Connor's initial
choice in determining the relevant observer of endorsement was
the minority nonadherent. This standard, first expressed in
Lynch 161 and referred to in Jaffree, 168 appears to be properly
grounded in the basic constitutional concern with protection of
minority religious rights. 169 While the standard of inquiry is
correct, however, the Lynch result itself indicates the danger
arising from judicial use of perception tests. Despite Justice
O'Connor's rhetoric adopting the vantage point of a minority
nonadherent, she concluded that government sponsorship of a
Nativity display merely endorses a cultural symbol and fails to
convey an impermissible message to nonadherents. 170 This conclusion reflects majoritarian rather than minority "nonadherent"
thinking, and the Lynch decision ultimately stands for the essence of establishment: the conversion to "culture" of the majority religion.
In the 1984-85 Term, Justice O'Connor made passing reference to her Lynch nonadherent standard, 171 but moved on to
165

166

465 U.S. at 690-94.

See Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3226 ("[A]n important concern of the effects
test is whether the symbolic union of church and state effected by the challenged
governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling
denominations as an endorsement, and by the non-adherents as a disapproval, of their
individual religious choices."); Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2490 (quoting tests from O'Connor's
Lynch concurrence).
• 67 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
168
105 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
169
See id. at 2497.
1
10 465 U.S. at 692-93.
171 See Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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adopt the vantage point of the reasonable person, the "objective
observer" or the "public at large." 172 Under this standard, she
determined that moment of silence legislation fails to engender
messages of endorsement. 173 On the other hand, she found that
minority Sabbath observers' time off in Thornton sent a message
of endorsement to majority nonobservant workers. 174
These holdings raise serious questions about the independent role of judicial establishment review. Since the "public at
large" has already expressed its views through the legislative
process, judicial adoption of a "public at large" standard for
examining legislation provides no review at all. More important,
the endorsement standard will not protect religious minorities.
Where government aid to religion is at stake, the objective
observer is deemed not to perceive a message of endorsement;
yet where a burden on free exercise is claimed, as in Thornton,
accommodation may be denied because others will see it as an
endorsement. The truly objective observer would seem to reach
opposite results. Thus the conclusions drawn by O'Connor demonstrate the danger that any such endorsement or perception
standard may be twisted to serve as a tool which supports
majoritarian ends.
C. The Lemon Entanglement Concern

As originally devised, the Lemon test provided that state
entanglement with religion in the administration of government
aid constituted an independent establishment clause violation.
The comprehensive inquiry examined the extent of financial and
administrative entanglement as well as political divisiveness resulting from the aid. 175 In recent years, the Court has substantially limited the entanglement inquiry. In Lynch and Mueller,
the Court indicated that the entanglement test would generally
focus solely on administrative entanglement-the extent of onin See Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Jaffree, 105 S. Ct.
at 2501 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
113 Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2501. But see May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561
(D.N.J. 1983) (emphasizing effect of moments of silence on nonbelievers), aff'd, 780
F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985).
114 105 S. Ct. at 2919.
115 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-20, 622-24.
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going government monitoring of religious affairs. 176 Mueller indicated that the concern over political divisiveness would be
limited to those cases involving direct financing to religious
institutions. 177
Despite these recent limitations, the entanglement test
showed renewed vitality in the 1984-85 Term. The importance
of the entanglement concern as an independent test was crucial
to the Court's evaluation of religion in the school cases. 178 However, consideration of administrative entanglement as an independent establishment evil is a double-edged sword. Separation
of government and religion necessarily requires some ongoing
government surveillance. 179 The point is to distinguish between
government involvement in the service of constitutional protections and entanglement arising from unconstitutional government promotion of religion.
V. Conceptual Problems: Establishment vs. Free Exercise
.The Court's approach in the 1984-85 opinions indicates
serious conceptual difficulties that portend future problems. The
central issue is the extent to which the first amendment allows
government intentionally to aid religion. The analysis employed
in these cases reflects the vitality of the new accommodation
doctrine, which blurs establishment and free exercise concerns
and eviscerates the first amendment religion clause analysis.
This accommodation doctrine, especially as applied in
Thornton and J affree, responds to the recently fashionable, but
largely semantic, construction of the religion clauses which has

176

See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403 n.11.

m 463 U.S. at 403 n.11.
178 Aguilar, for example, indicates that where there is a paucity of evidence of
religious effect the Court may look to evidence of extensive government involvement
aimed at averting promotion of religion. 105 S. Ct. at 3239. In addition to Aguilar's
concern over unconstitutional entanglement, the case posed the precise scenario of
political divisiveness contemplated in Mueller; 463 U.S. at 403 n.11. Justice Powell
devoted the substance of his Aguilar concurrence to the political divisiveness problems
presented by direct financial aid to religious institutions. See 105 S. Ct. at 3240-41.
179 See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741F.2d538, 556 (3d Cir. 1984),
rev'd on other grounds, 54 U.S.L.W. 4307 (1986); see also Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403.
But see Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.11 (unconstitutional entanglement results from
university having to determine "which words and activities fall within 'religious
worship"').
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produced an artificial tension between their two mandates. According to this somewhat pedantic reading of the clauses, if a
governmental religious purpose is automatically invalid under
the Lemon test, all free exercise accommodations are constitutionally flawed, since they are intended to facilitate religious
belief or practice. 180 Indeed, this reasoning appears to underlie
the Thornton analysis, although the Court could not explicitly
overturn the statute on religious purpose grounds without jeopardizing all future free exercise accommodations. Instead, the
Court referred to other putative establishment concerns which
are nonetheless characteristic of all legitimate free exercise accommodations-the effects of these accommodations on the
perceptions of others.
Jaffree posed the inverse problem-a statute which did not
present a free exercise accommodation responsive to a burden,
but which, as in Thornton, did have an exclusively religious
purpose. Because there was no burden necessitating accommodation, the Court held that the statute's religious purpose
raised establishment problems. The difference in the Jaffree and
Thornton analyses indicates that the religious purpose test may
not end the constitutional inquiry, lest all genuine free exercise
accommodations be similarly tainted. This dilemma is not ameliorated by the minimalist purpose inquiry employed in J affree.
Ironically, the "exclusively religious purpose" standard invalidates government-legislated free exercise accommodations,
while permitting, so long as there is any secular purpose, unnecessary government promotion of religion. As currently applied, therefore, the Lemon purpose inquiry fails to serve either
religion clause mandate.
Another unnecessary tension between establishment and
free exercise concerns is posed by the subjective imprimatur,
or endorsement, test. At this point, a religious purpose would
not, in itself, pose constitutional problems; some perception of
government aid, together with the intention to convey that endorsement, seems necessary. Such an appearance of govern1eo See, e.g., Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2504 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Choper,
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 673 (1980); G. Goldberg, Reconsecrating America (1984); Brief amicus curiae of
the United States, Jaffree.
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ment endorsement is diluted by the Court's receptivity to arrays
of aid which benefit both religion and nonreligion. This signals
the end of special treatment for religion 181 and allows government to promote religion as it does secular concerns. 182
Several alternatives have been offered to respond to the
artificial tension between the two religion clause mandates
caused by the present application of the Lemon test. One approach would reduce the tension by limiting the reach of one or
both clauses. The establishment mandate, for example, may be
limited by reading "religion" more narrowly for establishment
purposes than for free exercise purposes. 183 Alternatively, the
scope of free exercise concerns may be limited by allowing only
those accommodations necessary to lift burdens imposed by
government, not those imposed by private parties. 184
Another approach, that of finding a unifying theme for both
mandates, is epitomized by the new accommodation doctrine,
which seeks to draw support from the tension rather than to
limit it. The religion clauses are read against each other, with
the conclusion that the Founders could not have intended government accommodations to be antithetical to the establishment
clause. From this, a unifying theme is drawn which would allow
a variety of government accommodations, whether or not they
respond to actual burdens. 185 As shown above, however, this
approach results in a substitution of legislative judgments for
judicial review. Another unifying theme which has been offered
is that of "neutrality," under which the religion clauses are read
together to prohibit both burdens on, and benefits to, religion. 186
This proposal would be unworkable in practice; a "benefit"

181
This hearkens back to the Court's "neutrality" principle. See Everson, 330 U.S.
at 15-16; Brief for Petitioner at 10, Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 54
U .S.L.W. 4307 (1986) (seeking "equal treatment" for religious and non-religious groups).
m This attitude fails to recognize the historical commitment to treating religion
differently, which arises because "religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy •... "
Engel, 370 U.S. at 432.
183
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 832-33 (1978).
184 See Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
185 See McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 6 (forthcoming) (arguing for a "framework that acknowledges the legitimacy of encouraging and
facilitating religious liberty," and criticizing the Court for applying conflicting approaches
to free exercise cases and establishment cases).
186 See Kurland, The I"elevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 Vill. L. Rev. 3, 24 (1978).
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banned by the establishment clause might still be required under
free exercise.
The difficulty in reconciling the putative clash between the
two religion clauses does not, however, render incomprehensible the dual religion clause mandate or the Lemon inquiry. The
ostensibly invalid religious purpose of free exercise accommodation statutes and the perception of such a purpose by nonadherents should survive establishment scrutiny because there
is a compelling interest posed by free exercise rights. The establishment scrutiny should not be diluted by free exercise concerns, but should rather follow a two-step analysis. First, the
Court should subject the statute to the Lemon inquiry, looking
for an intent and effect of aiding religion. Second, the Court
should inquire whether the accommodation is responsive to a
government burden on religion or is required by another constitutionally compelling interest. J affree did hold that there was
no such government burden to be alleviated; 187 this passing
acknowledgment in the Court's opinion and in O'Connor's concurrence signals a potential check on the accommodation doctrine and false collisions between free exercise and establishment protections.
In conclusion, this Article contends that, rather than a doctrinal retreat from accommodation doctrine, the Court's holdings in the seven religion cases of the 1984-85 Term demonstrate
a continuing abdication of judicial review resulting in deference
to majoritarian legislation. Holdings that seem to signal a return
to former standards are actually very narrow, tracking controlling precedent. Moreover, the standards implemented by the
Court are formalistic, and traditional forms of government aid
to religion are given only perfunctory review. This formalistic
approach results in judicial support for government promotion
of majoritarian religion under the guise of cultural traditions.
Similarly, free exercise accommodations of minority religion
interests are defeated by almost any countervailing majoritarian
interests of administration or convenience. Such judicial deference to legislative decisions about religion threatens the independent role of judicial review and jeopardizes the fundamental

187

105 S. Ct. at 2491 n.45; see also id. at 2505 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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liberties of religious minorities-those who are most in need of
first amendment protection.
VI. Epilogue
The Court is not likely to retreat in the near future from
the standards apparent in the 1984-85 cases. Indeed, the 198586 Term has perpetuated these trends, and other cases soon to
be decided may be expected to follow suit. These cases continue
to call upon the Court· to choose between conflicting standards
of perception, demonstrating the problems with the endorsement approach to religion clause review.
In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind, 188 the Court balanced an array of assertedly indirect government aid to nonreligious beneficiaries with the longstanding
principle opposing government aid to a religious institution for
a religious purpose. The Court ruled that an individual's use of
state vocational rehabilitation funding to study for the ministry
did not have the effect of advancing religion. Because the Court
saw the aid as indirect, viewing the program as a whole rather
than focusing solely on Witters' use of the funding, it is not
surprising that the Court found no constitutional violatiop..
Bender v. Williamsport Area School District 189 involved free
speech. and establishment concerns posed by a high school
prayer club. The perception concern raised by children who
observed the prayer clubs on school premises was pitted against
an alleged array of nonreligious student clubs. Thus the subjective "religion in the schools" standard competed with the newer
emphasis on objective "arrays" or "equal access" for religion
and nonreligion. While the majority sidestepped the substantive
issues because of standing problems, the issues are likely to
resurface in the future. The conflict between the recently enacted Equal Access Act190 and the unanimity among the courts
1ss 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986).
189 54 U.S.L.W. 4307 (1986) (vacating judgment due to lack of standing of school
board member).
190 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 4071-74 (Supp. 1986). The Equal Access Act was enacted to
allow student religious groups to operate on public secondary school premises to the
same extent as other noncurricular student groups.
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of appeals, barring such clubs on constitutional grounds, 191 will
require Supreme Court resolution. In determining which perception standard will govern, the Court must decide whether
the government sponsorship involved in a high school prayer
club is more like teacher-led school prayer in the elementary
schools or like the Widmar university prayer club situations.
Indeed, the Bender dissents, which reached the merits, held
Widmar to be controlling. 192 In light of Grand Rapids and Aguilar, future resolution of the issues raised in Bender may tum on
the nature of teacher supervision of the student-initiated prayer
clubs. Extensive teacher involvement, coupled with the absence
of a true array, 193 could result in a decision against such a prayer
club.
Four other cases highlight the problems with the analysis
employed by the Court in Thornton. They raise the issue of the
extent to which government must accommodate free exercise
claims in the face of other government policy interests, alleged
establishment problems and other constitutional concerns.
These cases involve the availability of exemptions which might
be desirable to others, as is true of almost all free exercise
claims. Because of this, the Thornton perception standard is
inadequate, and the Court must look toward the nature of the
countervailing governmental interest. Unless the Court finds a
less restrictive alternative responsive to the government's concerns, it is likely to allow almost any governmental interest to
override religious liberty rights, as it did in Alamo and Lee.
Goldman v. Weinberger 194 involved a free exercise claim by
an Orthodox Jew who sought to wear a skullcap (yarmulke)

191 In addition to the Third Circuit, whose judgment in Bender, 741F.2d538 (1984),
was vacated, four other courts of appeals have ruled prayer clubs unconstitutional. See
Bell v. Little Axe lndep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985); Nartowicz v.
Clayton County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646 (11th Cir. 1984); Lubbock Civil Liberties
Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1155 (1983); Brandon v. Bd. of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
192 54 U.S.L.W. at 4312 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 4312 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
193 The high school in Williamsport, for example, had few clubs, none of which
were advocacy clubs similar to the proposed prayer club. The results in Grand Rapids
and Aguilar demonstrate the Court's unwillingness to accept false arrays in cases
involving the heightened protection accorded religion in the schools.
1
~ 54 U.S.L.W. 4298 (1986).
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while on military duty. The option of an unobtrusive exception
standard-permitting nonuniform gear as long as it is unobtrusive-would have addressed the military interest in uniformity
while allowing Goldman to wear a yarmulke. Yet the Court
found the government's interest in military uniformity to override the religious practice, employing a mere "reasonableness"
test. 195 The Court thus deferred to a majoritarian standard, using
minimal judicial review. Justice Brennan's dissent makes clear
the noncompelling nature of the governmental interest in this
case:
The Court's response to Goldman's request is to abdicate its role as principal expositor of the Constitution
and protector of individual liberties in favor of credulous deference to unsupported assertions of military
necessity . . . . [U]nder the guise of neutrality and
evenhandedness, majority religions are favored over
distinctive minority faiths. 196
Heckler v. Roy 191 concerns an American Indian's free exercise claim to an exemption from the Social Security number
requirement of AFDC and Food Stamp programs. Given the
Court's recent elevation of administrative interests, there appears to be no exemption to the Social Security number requirement which would be acceptable to the Court in Roy.
If the Court is satisfied with administrative interests and
uniformity as justifications for burdens on religious liberty, other
arguably more compelling interests, such as protecting against
establishment or discrimination, are also likely to take precedence. Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook198 and Ohio
Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools 199 pit religious liberty interests against preference and discrimination
concerns. Dayton Christian Schools involves a conflict between
a school's free exercise claim and a female teacher's right not
Id. at 4300.
Id. at 4301, 4303 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
197 No. 84-780, probable jurisdiction noted, 105 S. Ct. 3474 (1985).
198 No. 85-495, cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 848 (1986).
199 No. 85-488, jurisdictional issues postponed until hearing on merits, 106 S. Ct.
195

196

379 (1985).
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to be discriminated against on the basis of sex. At this stage in
the case, the issue is merely whether the state's civil rights
commission may assert jurisdiction over the school's decision
to discharge the teacher. The private school's religious liberty
claim for hiring appropriate role models is likely to succumb to
the state's interest in jurisdiction to investigate claims of sex
discrimination in employment. The religious school's claim of
exemption from state jurisdiction fails to provide a lesser restrictive alternative responsive to the state's concern.
Philbrook raises issues involving free exercise as it is protected by Title VII's reasonable accommodation provisions. The
teacher seeks days off for religious observance during approximately six holy days each year, while the school provides only
three such days for religious observance and three days for
"personal business." The Court may uphold the teacher's proposed accommodation-usage for religious observance of the
personal business days afforded to other employees, because
this poses no "undue hardship" to the employer. 200 Moreover,
in merely treating religious days as equal to other personal
business days, the accommodation would likely not run afoul
of the Thornton fairness concerns. However, the teacher's alternative offer of accommodation, whereby he would pay for
substitute teachers in return for which his own salary would
remain undiminished, is unlikely to be required by free exercise.
In light of the Thornton fairness concerns, such accommodation
might not even be allowed-the arrangements could be seen as
an endorsement of religion by other school employees, who
might desire similar arrangements for days off for nonreligious
reasons. Given the existence of less burdensome alternatives,
however, such as granting leave without pay, use of the twostep analysis described above, 201 rather than the Thornton approach, would indicate which accommodations survive establishment review and are required for free exercise.
:zoo See Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 485 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.
granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3484 (1986).
20 1 See supra text accompanying notes 186-87.

